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Abstract 
Virtual worlds are utterly contrived and artificial simulations of the actual world. As such, they offer 
exciting new opportunities to question taken-for-granted, supposedly naturally-occurring binaries such as 
subject/objects, human/non-human, and reality/fantasy and to explore computer-mediated work and 
play in ways that do not rely on a priori boundaries between people and technology, online and off-line 
identities, and actual and virtual reality. 
Focusing on the avatar as a sociomaterial assemblage constituted of the embodied user and his/her virtual 
embodiment, this research explores how virtual worlds users construct agency, identity and reality in 
situated practice by making agential cuts. Whereas prior research on virtual worlds has tended to frame 
the distinctions between the avatar and the user, between human and material agency, and between 
reality and fantasy in more essentialist terms, theorizing these boundaries as given and fixed, this 
research employs a performative lens. It identifies a number of discursive and material practices virtual 
world users rely on to construct identity, agency and worlds.  
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Objective and Motivation  
3D virtual worlds provide an exciting new opportunity for exploring computer-mediated work and play in 
ways that do not rely on a priori boundaries between online and off-line identities, social and material 
agencies and virtual and actual reality (Schultze and Orlikowski 2010). This is because virtual worlds 
provide users with a virtual body, or avatar, that acts within a digitally material world consisting of others, 
objects and landscapes. As such, virtual worlds are simulations of the actual world, that is, places with 
their own materiality, constraints and possibilities that nevertheless mimic actual reality. At the same 
time, they are utterly contrived and artificial (Malaby 2009), thus making room to question taken-for-
granted, supposedly naturally-occurring binaries such as subject/objects, male/female, human/non-
human, work/play, and reality/fantasy. 
More specifically, virtual worlds afford a performative perspective on computer-mediated work and play 
(Schultze and Orlikowski 2010) in that they are inherently performative – rather than representational 
(Barad 2003). People rely on performative utterances, i.e., meaningful speech acts such as “[avatar name] 
jumps for joy,” to take action in them (Murray 1997; Wolfendale 2007). Additionally, the immersiveness 
of the virtual world (its 3D-ness) is only actualized when users’ avatars perform physically and narratively. 
Thus, it is the performance of bodily practices such as walking, sitting, talking, etc., that gives places, 
objects and avatars their substance (Taylor 2002).  This challenges notions of objects, persons and 
geographies existing prior to the moment of action, and the representationalist contention that people 
must first construct the world in consciousness before they can act in it (Ingold 2000).   
Performativity invites us to conceptualize avatars as sociomaterial assemblages and identity, agency and 
world-making as material-discursive practices. In a performative ontology the focus is moved from inter-
actions between humans and their technological representation – both of which are deemed to exist as 
separate entities prior to the interaction – to intra-actions within an assemblage where the identities and 
properties of its elements are the result of agential cuts that are made in situated action (Barad 2003; 
Introna 2007). For example, to a customer calling into a call center, the components that form part of 
service delivery (i.e., the telephone system, the computer systems, the databases, the customer service 
representative, etc.) are experienced as an entangled whole until customer service representatives 
distance themselves from the (failing) technology with such utterances as “the computer has a mind of its 
own” or “it is not happy,” (Nyberg 2009). It is through such discursive practices that agential cuts are 
made, ascribing not only blame to the technology, but also creating identity and agency boundaries. 
Since avatars, that is, users’ virtual embodiments through which they act and interact in-world, are a 
distinguishing technological feature of virtual worlds, they will be the focus of this performative analysis 
of 3D virtual worlds.  Avatars re-embody communicators and make them present to both themselves and 
others. By having to define and present themselves in terms of virtual bodies that communicate in non-
discursive ways through appearance, clothing and gestures, virtual world users invariably engage in 
identity work (Kafai et al. 2010).  
However, avatars are not static representations of the user’s self; instead they are situated and variably 
enacted forms of presence (Schultze and Leahy 2009). At times, the avatar is seen as a separate entity, a 
doppelganger that behaves independently of the user it is modeled after (Bailenson and Segovia 2010). At 
other times, the user inhabits the avatar, fusing with it so completely that he/she feels entirely immersed 
and present in the virtual space (Gee 2008).  This suggests that definitions of identity (avatar vs. self), 
agency (material vs. human), and the world (actual vs. virtual) are fluid and situationally enacted. 
Most prior research on virtual worlds has tended to take a view that avatars are representational, 
assuming their online performances to be directed by the user’s prior, conscious self (Bardzell and 
Bardzell 2008). As such, the distinction between the user and his/her online identity are treated as given, 
fixed and unproblematic. For example, distinguishing between an actual, an ideal and a virtual version of 
the self, Bessiere et al.’s (2007) found that avatars in World of Warcraft represented players’ aspirational 
identities. Furthermore, agency is placed firmly with the user, with the avatar being a more or less 
animated cursor. This is particularly evident in laboratory studies that seek to demonstrate that results 
generated in virtual worlds replicate human behavior in “real” settings (Yee et al. 2007). These studies 
also tend to treat the technological interface as the de-facto boundary between the virtual and the “real” 
world. 
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In contrast to this representational view of virtual worlds, a performative lens posits that all entities that 
are entangled in an in-world experience (i.e., computers, users, avatars, virtual others, etc.) acquire their 
identities, properties and capabilities in the moment and through their interpenetration (Orlikowski and 
Scott 2008). This implies that the elements implicated in an assemblage and the boundaries that define 
them do not exist a priori, but are the result of agential cuts that are made in practice (Barad 2003; 
Nyberg 2009).   
Understanding how the elements that constitute a phenomenon, such as an avatar-mediated experience, 
are mobilized and how they are allowed to do some things and not others, is therefore key to a 
performative research agenda (Mouritsen 2006).  The objective of this paper is to develop a performative 
understanding of the avatar as a sociomaterial entanglement by focusing on how virtual world users 
construct binaries such as avatar/self, human/technology and actual/virtual within the entanglement that 
constitutes their in-world experience. In other words, this research seeks to gain insight into the 
discursive and material boundary-drawing practices virtual world users rely on to construct identities, 
agencies and worlds by answering the following question: How do virtual worlds users construct the 
boundaries of identity, agency and worlds in their in-world experience?  
The paper proceeds as follows: It briefly introduces performativity as an ontological lens.  It then develops 
a theoretical understanding of the avatar as a sociomaterial entanglement.  Prior research on avatars is 
reviewed as part of this theory development.  The research method is outlined, followed by the 
presentation of the empirical insights. The paper will conclude with a discussion of the research 
implications and opportunities for future inquiry using a performative lens in virtual world and IS 
research.  
The Performative Lens 
As a sociomaterial ontology, the performative lens seeks to avoid the a priori, taken for granted 
boundaries between the social and the material (Orlikowski 2007), that is, the distinctions between 
people and things, between subject and object, and between meaning and phenomenon that are 
frequently the result of grammatical categories embedded in the language we use (Barad 2003). It does so 
by focusing on the material-discursive practices through which phenomena are enacted (Orlikowski 
2010).  Furthermore, it advances a relational ontology that seeks to restore a symmetrical relationship 
between human and non-human agency by acknowledging that both are capable of acting and inscribing 
meaning (Nyberg 2009). 
A performative perspective is associated with a focus on action and enactment, that is, on the “mundane, 
everyday practices that shape the conduct of human beings towards others and themselves in particular 
sites” (Thrift 1997, cited in Nash 2000: 655). It rests on a linguistic understanding of action, which 
highlights how things are done with words (Searle 2010). Words do not only signify things, thereby 
serving a representational function (Mokros and Deetz 1996), but they also enact them. For instance, 
utterances like “with this ring, I thee wed” do not only describe what is happening but actually perform 
the action (Austin 1962). In other words, they are constitutive of the reality they describe (Callon 1998).  
Performativity represents an ontological lens that views reality as “a doing,” as enacted in ongoing 
practice (Barad 2003; Mol 2002).  It regards reality not as composed of fixed and independent entities 
that inter-act, but as constituted by fluid, dynamic, multiple, and emergent phenomena composed on 
intra-acting, entangled material and social elements known as an assemblage. The concept of assemblage 
moves the focus from inter-actions between humans and their technological representations -- both of 
which are deemed to exist as separate entities prior to the interaction in the representational ontology -- 
to intra-actions among entangled elements whose identities and properties are dynamically constructed 
in practice (Barad 2003; Introna 2007). This implies that the boundaries between situationally-entangled 
elements in an assemblage are fluid and temporal (Nyberg 2009).  
Barad (2003) refers to the boundaries that are drawn among intra-acting components as agential cuts. 
These are situated temporal delineations or demarcations that can nevertheless become habituated as 
part of material and discursive practices or by means of an apparatus, i.e., the instruments through which 
knowledge are produced (Scott and Orlikowski 2009).  
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The Avatar as Sociomaterial Entanglement  
Avatars give virtual world users bodies and make them present. As such, the are frequently seen as 
representations of their users in that their appearance and actions signal the user’s identity (Taylor 2002). 
For instance, Vasalou et al. (2008) found that people used avatars (i) to accurately reflect their offline 
selves by displaying stable self-attributes, (ii) to construct a playful representation of the self, and (iii) to 
send an embodied message. This representationalist logic underlies much of the research into online 
environments where the locus of social interaction is seen as occurring in a virtual space untethered from 
the user’s body that is sitting at a computer terminal somewhere (Hardey 2002). This sets up an a priori 
distinction between the “real” physically-embodied user and the avatar as a technological artifact that 
represents the actual user.   
Representationalism, whose logic rests on the separation between the signifier and the signified, i.e., the 
“real” phenomenon, stands in contrast to performativity (Barad 2003). Instead of regarding the signifier 
and the signified as existing prior to their interaction, the relational ontology that is performativity sees 
them as co-emerging during the enactment of a phenomenon through the practice of entangled social and 
material components that constitute an assemblage (e.g., people, institutional structures, telephone wires, 
computers, databases, etc.).  
From a performative perspective, the avatar is viewed not as a technological artifact but as an assemblage 
whose elements include the corporeal user and his/her immediate social and physical environment; the 
computer and browser he/she is using; the internet connection and the computer network that makes the 
virtual world and interactions with others possible; the databases, servers, and programs that render the 
virtual world, etc.  At different points in time, however, cuts are made to distinguish and delineate 
different elements that constitute this assemblage, thus dynamically assigning them identity, properties 
and agency.  
Unlike technologies such as email or personal web pages, avatars are not just vehicles through which 
users present themselves to others in virtual worlds; instead, their online performances are also directed 
at the user. In other words, through avatars virtual world uses are not only engaged in other-regarding or 
transitive acts, but also in self-regarding or reflexive speech acts (Powers 2003). This implies that virtual 
world users who see themselves interacting with others in avatar-form, are frequently confronted by 
questions of identity like “Is this me? Do I act like that? Is this really what I am like?”  
Furthermore, when employing an avatar not all aspects of performance are under the user’s control 
(Taylor 2002). Avatars are frequently perceived as almost autonomous (Bailenson and Segovia 2010; 
Schultze and Leahy 2009), suggesting that the bodies and selves users create have some rooting in the 
social world outside of them. Bardzell and Bardzell (2008: 12) maintain that avatars are subjectivities: “A 
subjectivity, in contrast [to a representation], is a living force, an agent that both acts in the world and is 
constituted in the world through action.” Consequently, questions of agency tend to arise for users: “Is 
that me acting or is it my avatar? Does my avatar have a mind of its own? I am telling it what to do and 
say, or is it acting on its own volition?” 
By virtue of their name, virtual worlds re-inscribe a split between “virtuality,” which is associated with 
information, the mind, and fantasy, and “reality,” which is associated with materiality and the body (Ito 
1997).  Under closer examination, however, this split implodes, revealing a fuzzy boundary that 
Castronova (2005) calls a “membrane.”  People’s experiences inside and outside virtual worlds cannot be 
isolated from one another. This means that users are frequently confronted by questions around the 
nature of the world they are acting in: “is this event real or is this fantasy?  Are the people I am engaging 
with real or not? Are my feelings real or are they just part of a fairy tale?”  
It is important to note that these three dimensions serve an analytical function; that is, they are not 
mutually exclusive, collectively exhaustive categories with which users make sense of the assemblage that 
is the avatar. Indeed, there is considerable overlap among the three dimensions. Nevertheless, they are 
useful as analytical starting points for distinguishing among the different material and discursive 
practices that virtual world users rely on to make agential cuts in practice.  
Identity 
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Identity is the answer to such questions as “who am I?” and “what am I like?” (Chatman et al. 2005). 
People have multiple identities, e.g., father, student, manager, Asian, etc., that reflect different aspects of 
the overall self (Leary and Tangney 2003). In fact, people have as many identities as social contexts they 
act in. This is because identities reside not only in people’s minds, but also in the social context in which 
they are located and the artifacts with which they interact (Talamo and Ligorio 2001). Thus, identities are 
activated, sometimes multiple at once, in given situations.  
Prior research on online identities tends to apply a representational lens, maintaining that virtual 
identities are performances that are directed by the user sitting at the computer.  This “performed” notion 
of identity (Brickell 2005; Gregson and Rose 2000) is based on Goffman’s (1959) contention that when 
individuals come in contact with other people, they will attempt to control or guide the impression that 
others might have of them by changing or fixing the setting, as well as their own appearance and manner.  
During such a performance, the self is divided into to two aspects: the performer, who fabricates the 
impressions, and the character, who emerges out of the ongoing performance (Goffman 1959).  This 
separation between the performer and the character suggests that a performed identity relies on an active, 
prior and conscious agent (an “I”) that intentionally acts out a role in a given context (Gregson and Rose 
2000). In other words, there is doer behind the deed (Van Doorn 2010), a core, essential self that is 
perceived as the origin of an individual’s thoughts and actions (Hickey-Moody and Wood 2008).  
The notion of a performed online identity creates the impression that the user’s self can be discerned and 
that its essence can be grasped (Mouritsen 2006). Such an essentialist view of identity implies that selves 
are composed of elements and properties that exist prior to any social interaction. Categorizing the self 
into a true, an ought and a possible self (McKenna 2007) is emblematic of this perspective. For instance, 
Bessiere et al.’s (2007) research on identity exploration in World of Warcraft revealed that the 
discrepancy between players’ virtual and ideal selves was smaller than that between their actual and ideal 
selves. They thus conclude that avatars represent stable, aspirational identities (also Lawson 2000). 
Furthermore, representations can be assessed for their correspondence to reality, suggesting that 
misrepresentations create deceptive identities (Donath 1999) and fake selves (Tracy and Trethewey 
2005).  
Agency 
Generally speaking, agency is an entity’s capacity for action (Giddens 1984). Distinctions are frequently 
made between human and material agency. Human agency is generally regarded as an individual’s ability 
to form goals and realize them (Leonardi 2011). It is associated with a mind, intentionality and reflexive 
interpretation that allow human beings to act with choice and relative freedom, thus making this a moral 
agency (Introna 2007).  Material agency, in contrast, is defined as the capacity of non-human entities to 
act on their own (Leonardi 2011), even though it might be a derived agency, encoded by humans into an 
artifact (Introna 2007).   
Frequently, material agency is attributed to entities, including technologies, that are not entirely under 
people’s control.  Since material entities are not accorded a mind of their own, human agency is generally 
regarded as primary in the inevitable interaction between people and things, including technology. Taylor 
et al. (2001) thus refer to human agency as having “lead status” compared to material agency’s 
“complement status.”   
Applying a representational view of reality, Leonardi (2011) highlights that human and material agencies 
are separate and given. In other words, agency is the property of an entity. Nevertheless, he maintains 
that both are necessary to take action.  In fact, it is by imbricating or interlacing these two types of 
agencies in different ways that specific actions become possible. This perspective reflects an inter-actional 
view of socio-technical agency (Introna 2007), in that it attributes agency to humans and artifacts prior to 
their engagement in technology-mediated practice.  
The performative perspective challenges this inter-actional notion of agency by maintaining that in 
practice, human and material agency are indistinguishable.  Nyberg (2009) illustrates this in his analysis 
of call center work.  He points out that to a customer calling in, the components that are part of the service 
delivery (i.e., the telephone system, the computer systems, the databases, the customer service 
representative, etc.) are experienced as a whole. The caller does not separate among the different 
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elements and agencies interoperating in the service delivery; instead, she/he is likely to regard the service 
provider as the cyborg that he/she has become in this thoroughly technologically-mediated setting.   
In prior research on virtual worlds, avatars are typically distinguished from embodied agents or bots on 
the basis of agency. Avatars are driven by humans agency, whereas bots are technology-driven in that they 
operate according to a programmed script (Bailenson et al. 2006). However, doppelgangers, that is, 
avatars that act independently of the user they represent, ascribes agency to the technology when users 
merely observe their avatars take certain action rather than interact with them (Bailenson and Segovia 
2010). This research shows that avatars that look similar to the user and that change as a result of their 
actions (e.g., losing weight in proportion to the amount they exercise), are effective in shaping the user’s 
actual behavior (e.g., continuing to exercise a week after observing their avatar). In these experiments, 
however, agency attributions are binary, with human agency being limited to the physically-embodied 
user.   
World 
Virtual worlds are frequently associated with game worlds, casting what happens in them as separable 
from “real life,” as well as safe and fun (Malaby 2007). Drawing on his own studies of gambling in Greece 
and other anthropologists’ studies of games in other societies, Malaby (2007) however shows that these 
characterizations of games do not hold empirically.  Game participation often plays an integral role in 
other aspects of social life, affecting identity, reputation, and social connections, in addition to any 
financial stakes that may be at play (Juul 2005). With such stakes, the implications of participants’ in-
world experiences are not limited to their virtual lives. As such, activities in-world are not safe and free of 
“real” consequences.  
Nevertheless, in much research on virtual worlds, the boundary between the virtual and the “real” is 
defined in technological terms. The boundary is synonymous with the interface of the virtual 
environment: upon donning a head-mounted display in a virtual reality setting or logging into the virtual 
environment as an avatar, the user transitions into the realm of the virtual (Lee 2004). Indeed, Murray 
(1997) highlights that providing clear boundaries between the “real” and the imaginary is an important 
design criterion for virtual environments that seek to enhance user immersion and to convey a powerful 
story line. 
This conceptualization of the real-virtual boundary is also evident in laboratory studies of virtual worlds 
that have sought to demonstrate that results generated in virtual worlds replicate human behavior in the 
“real” world. Research that finds that “real”-world social norms regarding non-verbal communication and 
practices of the body persist in virtual environments – e.g., different interpersonal distance between 
friends and strangers is maintained (e.g., Soukup 2004), people face the person with whom they are 
interacting (e.g., Taylor 2002), and users employ different eye gaze strategies based on the interaction 
partner’s gender (Yee et al. 2007) – generates support for the contention that virtual world labs generate 
“realistic” results.    
 
As this brief literature review of identity, agency and world-making has highlighted, most of the prior 
literature on avatars and viritual worlds has adopted a representational lens.  A performative perspective 
challenges the a priori and fixed distinctions representationalism makes between avatar and self, material 
and human agency and reality and virtuality.  It highlights instead that these boundaries are drawn in 
situated action, making them dynamic and temporary. It therefore encourages us to explore the how, 
when and why of boundary-drawing, agential cuts by which identities, agency and worlds are construed, 
rendering some traits, incidents and relationships as “real” and others as virtual or fantasy.  
Method 
In order to explore avatars from a performative perspective, this paper relies on data collected during a 
35-participant study of the avatar-self relationship in Second Life (SL). The reasons for choosing this 
virtual world include (i) its large membership (about 18 million accounts in January 2010, when data 
collection took place), (ii) the customizability and hence diversity of activities (including socializing, 
gaming, education and commerce), landscapes, as well as avatar appearance and behavioral 
characteristics it supports, and (iii) its ownership policies and economic openness, which encourages 
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residents to develop their own virtual objects and businesses.  The openness of the SL platform and the 
peer-produced nature of its content imply that SL residents have to define and enact their in-world 
identities, activities and interests with little guidance, thus making it a particularly suitable setting for 
exploring the avatar as a sociomaterial entanglement.  
Figure 1: Domains of Use 
 
 
Based on a theoretical sampling logic, this paper analyzes data collected from four female SL residents. 
Theoretical sampling involves choosing cases that exhibit the phenomenon of interest naturally and 
intensively thus allowing the researcher to examine and elaborate on the theoretical constructs under 
investigation (Patton 1990). The four participants were chosen because (i) they each operated primarily in 
one of the four domains of use that characterize SL (see Figure 1), suggesting that the sample is 
representational of the different ways in which social virtual worlds are used, and (ii) they were very 
articulate and thoughtful research participants, implying that particularly rich data was available for each 
case1. Since the purpose of this study is to develop empirically-grounded theoretical insights rather than 
test an extant theory in (and generalize it to) the virtual worlds context, the richness of the data and the 
logic underlying the theoretical sampling is more important than sample size (Orlikowski and Baroudi 
1991). 
The domains of use framework was inspired by Schultze and Rennecker’s (2007) categorization of 
synthetic worlds.  However, given that SL relies on user-generated content rather than designer-scripted 
narratives, the framework dimensions were adapted to differentiate between the different purposes of use 
(professional vs. social) and the different social structures (emergent vs. defined) within which the users 
were operating.  This resulted in the following use domains:  
• Simulation: focuses on the creation of economic capital through the construction and sale of 
products and services to in-world customers. Here, virtual worlds are treated as complete 
substitutes for the material objects, people and processes that they represent. Thus the 
connection to the referent, i.e., the actual, is suspended. Like a pilot who is training on a flight 
simulator treats the model as an adequate facsimile of the actual plane, so SL is treated as its own 
complete marketplace/economy. 
• Virtualization: revolves around digitizing the actual world, thus making the virtual world an 
extension of the “real.”  Here, the value of the virtual world lies in solving “real world” problems, 
such as providing virtual classrooms in the event that physical campuses are shut down due to 
N1H1 virus outbreaks, for example. Thus, continuity and congruence between the virtual and the 
actual is emphasized.  
• Free Play: revolves around the construction of a perfect alternate reality as measured by the 
standards of actual reality.  Many of the people who participate in this domain are focused on 
building relationships with others to make up for meaningful activities, interactions and 
                                                             
1 This might be related to the fact that the researcher was female and that women participants were thus more 
comfortable with the interviewing process than men were. 
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relationships that they lack in their actual lives. Even though they seek a virtual life that is 
“perfect” and unencumbered by actual reality, they nevertheless resist any depiction of SL as a 
game. Instead, they describe it as a simulation or “pixelated” version of actual reality.  
• Role Play: focuses on a community or “clan” with established norms and rules that help 
maintain the fantasy members are seeking to enact. There are numerous role-play communities in 
SL, ranging from medieval to futuristic settings. The 3D nature of SL makes these role-play 
settings accessible in that it materializes the fantasy world. Avatars can take on the embodiments 
of trees, elves, dragons and vampires, and digital geographies (e.g., Sherwood Forest) and objects 
(e.g., medieval weapons) both enable coherent role-play and constrain inauthentic action. 
 
Table 1 summarizes the demographic details of the four participants constituting the sample for this 
analysis.  
Table 1: Summary of Participants  
Avatar Name2 RL Name1 Age:  Domain of Use Primary Purpose 
Guarant Teutonicus Terri RL: 21y 
SL: 7m 
Virtualization  Developing Presence for 
University  
Mitt Richards Mathilda RL: 31y 
SL: 13m 
Simulation  Designing Neko3 Fashions 
Mantis Avalon Sara RL: 43y 
SL: 38m 
Free Play  Maintaining Intimate 
Relationship 
Yazhi Orlean Maureen SL: 35y 
SL: 10m 
Role Play Developing Story Lines for 
Vampire Role Play 
 
The participants were interviewed between December 2009 and February 2010.  Each participant lived in 
the southwestern United States, within driving distance for the researcher, and spent at least 10 hours a 
week in-world. The data collection method was intended to gain maximal insight into the participants’ 
own understanding of their activities and experiences with their avatars.  Data were collected in two 
phases:  
1) Initial 2-hour, face-to-face interview: The purpose of this interview was to gain background 
information on the participant’s use of SL, to be introduced to their primary avatar, the groups they had 
joined and the places where they spent most of their time.  These initial interviews were held in 
bookstores that offered wireless Internet access so that interviewees could log into SL during the 
interview.  A key objective of the face-to-face meeting was to build the kind of rapport and trust needed to 
continue with the photo-diary phase of the research. 
2) Weekly photo-diaries (for 3 weeks), which provided the basis for weekly interviews.  These photo-
diary interviews were conducted by phone and took about 1 hour each. This interview method was 
inspired by research in human geography (Latham 2003), which in turn is an adaptation of the 
“diary:diary-interview” method developed by sociologists (Zimmerman and Wieder 1977). Diary methods 
approximate observational research and are particularly useful in situations in which first-hand 
observations are not possible (Czarniawska 2007).  This is because diary methods afford the possibility of 
gaining some degree of access to naturally occurring events, as well as their meaning and significance.   
The photo-diary interview method relies not so much on intimate journals as on annotated logs kept by 
the research participants.  These diaries are then used as the basis for intensive interviewing (Zimmerman 
and Wieder 1977). Since SL has a "snapshot" feature, it is very easy and efficient for participants to take 
                                                             
2 All names are disguised.   
3 Neko is Japanese for cat. In SL, members of the neko sub-culture wear tails, ears and whiskers, as well 
as clothes with tears and holes in them.  
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photos and provide a few annotative statements (i.e., answering when, what, why, who, and how 
questions for every snapshot) to construct the diary. Thus, the time burden typically associated with diary 
methods was significantly reduced. Additionally, the photographs captured the material conditions of 
each incident, thus making it possible to gain insight into both discursive and material practices. 
Additionally, it anchored the phone interviews in actual events, thus making them more grounded.  
Participants were asked to proceed with their SL activities as they normally would, but to take a snapshot 
of incidents or instances that were in some way meaningful, significant or important to them.  These 
snapshots were then pasted into a researcher-supplied photo-diary template, which outlined the 
annotation questions.  Participants were asked to include at least 5 snapshots in each weekly diary and to 
submit the diary at least 12 hours prior to the scheduled phone interview.  During the diary interview, the 
incidents documented in the photo-diary were used to explore the participants’ relationship with his/her 
avatar in a situated context.  
Participants were recruited via SL groups that had some association with the targeted geographic area.  
Given the considerable time commitment required by this research, that is, ~8 hours over a 4-week 
period, participants were paid $150.  With the participants’ permission, all interviews were tape-recoded. 
Data Analysis  
The data analysis followed the interpretive tradition in that it leveraged the concepts of agential cuts (i.e., 
material and discursive practices of boundary drawing), identity (i.e., avatar vs. self), agency (i.e., human 
vs. material) and world-making (i.e., virtual vs. actual), as sensitizing devices (Walsham 2006). As the 
photo-diaries and transcribed interviews were read repeatedly and organized into themes following the 
tenets of grounded theorizing (Strauss and Corbin 1998), a more complex understanding of both the 
theoretical concepts and the data evolved.  Sub-themes emerged as a result of constant comparison 
among the higher-level themes and the practices across the different domains of use. In this way, insights 
were generated regarding how SL users drew identity, agency and world-making boundaries in practice. 
Empirical Insights 
Identity  
The entanglement between users and their avatars was apparent in the way the interviewees talked about 
their experiences with and as their virtual bodies. At different points in time, their avatars represented 
past, current, and ideal images of themselves.  This is illustrated by the following quotes from Sara, 
discussing her avatar, Mantis:  
[Mantis is] much more outgoing … and much more fun loving, which is something I really have 
not actually given myself the permission [to be] or just any real option for myself.  I guess when I 
was younger, and at the age where I should have been having fun, I was described as 18 going on 
35. So Mantis is a way that I can sort of go back and sort of celebrate all of those things that I 
never got to do, or I chose not to do in my younger years. 
When you see someone who’s a little bit more edgy it makes you think, “oh, that’s probably a 
person who’s really not afraid to express themselves,”....  I am a person that doesn’t like to express 
themself for fear of others judging more or thinking different things.  … I guess the more edgy 
Mantis represents my ideal.   
And then [Mantis’] little softer side is sort of being true to myself, because that’s really who I am. 
You know, I will always try to soften it and make it better and try to say it in a more comforting 
way. 
These quotes highlight how dynamic the relationship between the user and her avatar was. Who the 
avatar represented was neither unitary nor stable. Instead, the avatar’s identity was multi-faceted and 
dynamic, much like the user’s own.  
Additionally, it was not clear whose identity – the avatar or the user’s – was primary.  As the following 
quote from Maureen suggests, users reflect their avatars’ persona, just as much as avatars reflect their 
users’ thoughts and feelings:  
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You do become your avatar. It’s very much like Cameron’s new movie. You take on their persona. 
… It’s not like in other video games, where you’re just controlling a character to do things.  That 
character is actually speaking for you, and your thoughts are their thoughts. 
These quotes illustrate the entangled nature of the avatar and user identities in virtual worlds.  
Nevertheless, they also highlight the agential cuts that users make as they distinguish between who they 
are and who their avatars are. These cuts are made discursively and materially. For instance, by referring 
to avatars in third person, thus rendering them independent entities, users distinguished between 
themselves and their avatar discursively. By constructing alternate online identities, known as “alts,” they 
relied on material practices for making cuts between themselves and their avatar.  
As the quotes below show, the discursive practice of referring to their avatar by name and using 3rd-person 
pronouns such as “she,” were pervasive and indicative of how agential cuts between the avatar and the 
user’s self were made: 
Mitt started as a land sales person and she danced at a club just because I wanted to see what that 
was like.  You know, I would never do that and I kept telling people, “no, no, no, don’t do that; 
that’s demeaning.”  But I was like, “you know what; I want to see what it’s all about.” And I 
actually ended up not being liked by the people at the club because there’s something about Mitt. 
All these other dancers would be lucky to get like 200 Linden a night. Mitt would get 5,000 to 
10,000 a night!  
It makes me happy that people want to be like Mitt, you know, and … I like to go around and 
“mitt” people, that’s what we call it.  And I’ll do makeovers and stuff … Mitt is a style. She is a 
brand and many people want to be Mitt. And how that happened, I don’t know.  
I mean, there were some pretty awful guys that came through and of course they would hit on me 
and Mantis flirts back; she just can’t help herself. … There's always going to be something about 
Mantis.  She's either going to have super-daring cleavage or really short shorts, or something. … 
[She’s] really flirty, really kind of quirky, random.   
A material practice by which users made identity cuts, was by creating alternate embodiments known as 
alts. Mathilda, who found that Mitt was unable to do anything but work because her customers and 
friends were IM’ing her all the time, used her alt as a way of dealing with this social overload. By logging 
in as her alt, she was essentially in-world incognito.  Even though she felt uncomfortable with this, she 
also realized that the constant multi-tasking that both she and Mitt were engaged in, made it difficult to 
be around them. Only a handful of Mitt’s best friends were aware of her alt’s identity. 
In contrast, Maureen, who engaged in vampire role-play in order to develop her writing and storytelling 
skills, regularly used four avatars. They were all female, shared the same last name and had her blue eyes. 
Her main avatar was Yazhi, a character that she had developed to honor her own Native American 
heritage. In fact, her name meant “little one” in Navajo, a name that Maureen had been called growing up.  
Maureen described Yazhi as follows:  
Yazhi, she has a whole life of her own.  She's able to go and do all the things and be all the things 
that don't have to do with being a wife and a mother. … She is my inner me, my inner me me, 
that's just about Maureen. … Sometimes what we really think and feel gets hidden or lost in all of 
our have-tos. All of our want-tos get lost.  So I think Yazhi is my want-tos.  She's my writer and 
my painter and my creator, all the things that in real life sometimes get pushed to the side and 
forgotten. … She is able to just be the Maureen … that is there, but never gets to be seen, I think. 
In light of Yazhi’s identity as the creative Maureen, not weighed down by the responsibilities of being a 
wife and mother, Maureen created another avatar that she used merely to spend time with her RL (real 
life) husband in-world.  While she saw Yazhi as the person she would like to be, she described her 
husband-specific alt as follows: 
I think [alt name] is just sort of a prettier me, like I don't really feel any other connection to her, 
other than what I feel to myself in real life. … She's just me. 
Her second alt was used purely for vampire role-play. Even though Yazhi had been initially created for 
this, Maureen felt restricted in the kind of role-play she was able to do with her. This was because she was 
concerned about Yazhi’s reputation, which was closely associated with her own. Even though she had 
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intended not to share any information about herself with people in SL, maintaining an impermeable 
boundary between SL and RL had proven difficult.  Thus, being associated with Maureen’s Christian 
values, Yazhi was no longer free to engage in any kind of role-play. In contrast to Yazhi, this alt was 
“extremely naughty” and “just crazy and dirty.” For Maureen, pulling off a character that was so different 
from her proved “really hard” and “very challenging.” She needed to do research to ensure that she played 
the role of a crazy vampire credibly.  
Maureen’s third and final alt was used to participate in non role-play environments. She used her to 
participate in poetry reading and writing circles. She also served as the owner of the store through which 
Maureen planned to sell the vampire storylines she was developing. As this alt served as Maureen’s 
representative in business dealings, i.e., RL transactions, she created an avatar that resembled her 
physically.   
Interestingly, neither Terri nor Sara had alts, suggesting that this material practice of using alternate 
embodiments as a way of segmenting the avatar-user’s identity and social relationships, was not equally 
important in all domains of use.  Indeed, the coherence and continuity between the actual and the virtual 
world valued in the virtualization domain would make the use of alts problematic, as “real” people are 
limited to one material embodiment or corporeality. In contrast, the freedom accorded the users in the 
free play domain would make alts less important as devices for dealing with social overload or the 
expectations of the community to which an avatar’s identity was tied.  
Agency 
As is apparent from the above discussion about identity, avatars were accorded independence from the 
user, making the assignment of agency a natural extension of this logic. Many of the participants’ 
comments alluded to their avatars being capable of cognition, emotions and intentionality:   
In the long run, it really comes down to what Mitt likes, you know.  I do have a certain image that 
Mitt has kind of been known for, but whenever I get stuck in those little image things where 
people are like, “OK, that’s very Mitt,” Mitt likes to come out of nowhere with some things totally 
different. … I think, Mitt likes to be a bit of a mystery when it comes to [designing clothes] 
because nobody knows [what she’ll do next], nobody knows. 
[Mitt has] been wearing big baggy flannels that hang off her shoulder. … Just because she’s fed up 
right now.  She just does not want extra attention.  That’s why she went offline to everybody, too. 
At the campus leads meetings [in SL], I know that I'm an undergrad, so I try to sit off to the side 
and stuff.  But actually it's usually Guarant that feels like she is in a position that's greater than 
that, because she is the one who has all the skills to be able to do the work. … So I mean, it's 
definitely Guarant that feels like she's in a higher position. 
In addition to using these discursive practices to accord their avatars agency, the participants also 
leveraged the avatar’s technological features to construct an impression that the avatar was being directed 
by them, when in fact it was not. Thus, they relied on material agency to create the impression of human 
agency. For instance, users frequently relied on looping avatar animations to fake their own presence or 
attention in-world:   
It’s a dance party, so I could just put [Yazhi] on auto dance and carry on writing. I had my 
computer split in half, and I was writing a document on one side, and every once in a while I’d go 
over and read the chat a little bit, and I’d put, “oh, LOL, that was funny,” or whatever. So in that 
way, it was easy for me to be somewhere but not really have to interact with people.  
I like to think that as [Guarant]’s sitting there, she is becoming a familiar face, more or less.  I 
hope that by now people have noticed my name along with my avatar, and consistency with my 
attendance and stuff, and just acknowledge me in some way.  But behind the screen, I suppose, 
I'm kind of using her to zoom around [with the camera] and make judgment calls by looking at 
how things are going, instead of listening to what they're saying. 
By making the avatar rather than the user the operator in the virtual world, some participants attributed 
considerable control and technological agency to their virtual bodies.  Among the interviewees, Terri, 
went the furthest in according an independent identity and agency to her avatar, Guarant. Terri was an 
underperforming undergraduate at a university that was developing a SL presence.  After taking a course 
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on virtual worlds, in which Terri excelled, she was invited to work on the university’s SL project. As the 
following interview excerpt shows, this was a significant experience:  
For the first time in like a really long time I thought like I was really good at something.  Like I 
was in a better position to be a leader, and I really liked that because that’s how I've always felt 
but, just because of not doing well as an undergrad, I guess, I was just kind of discouraged from 
doing any leadership sort of roles in real life.  And I guess Guarant's activity motivated me and 
showed me that those qualities that I used to have, like I still do have. 
Terri began to see Guarant as “motivated,” “powerful” and “authoritative.”  Guarant simply had more 
“control” over SL than Terri had over RL:  
I can't even conceive of the amount of control [Guarant] has within Second Life. Just being able to 
create just about anything, down to like the tiniest details.  She can control the objects, creating 
objects around her.  She has a lot of control and say within the environments…   
Guarant seems to do a much better job at [communicating].  She tends to type things correctly 
and backspace and articulate what she wants to say.  I'm definitely a little envious of that. … She 
does a better job at getting the point across. 
People listen to her, because she speaks with authority, I suppose.  And I guess it's that she just 
has a lot more power than I do in real life. … And she tends to be much more assertive and better 
about connecting with people and just working in general. … I find she like makes her way around 
into more prominent positions a lot more easily than I do. 
Guarant had “direction” and took on positions of leadership and responsibility to which Terri, as an 
undergraduate, had no apparent access. Together with Guarant, Terri felt that she was able to realize her 
style and the ideas that she was struggling to express. With Terri’s ideas and Guarant’s control over the 
digital environment, they made a creative team:   
Now that I'm building again, I'm using more of my own style, and those are things that come from 
me and not from Guarant.  But I'm using her at the same time to help me create these things.  
Because she's the one who has the control and the power to make my ideas manifest, basically.  So 
now … it's like we're working together more. … me and Guarant are a team.  
This experience was so powerful, that Terri wanted to “strengthen” Guarant’s influence in her life and 
“help her identity spread online.”  She therefore changed all her accounts on social networking sites like 
Facebook and Twitter, as well as her computer, to Guarant Teutonicus. In this way, she sought to move 
Guarant out of the confines of the virtual world in an attempt to absorb her control and power, i.e., her 
agency.  
World 
As the empirical illustrations above have suggested, the distinction between actual and virtual reality was 
not well defined. Relying on discursive and material practices, the participants dynamically apportioned 
motivations, skills and actions between themselves and their avatars. The same kind of dynamisms and 
ambiguity was apparent when it came to distinguishing between reality and fantasy:   
In role play, I was engaged in a battle with [a male avatar] … and I lost. And the terms of the 
battle was, if I lost, then he claimed me as his mate in [the role play sim].  … I lost the battle, and 
when [Mitt’s SL partner] came back on and heard of that, even though it was role play, he had a 
hard time dealing with the fact that that was role play.  He thought that it was betrayal.  
[The king in Yazhi’s role play clan] doesn’t even IM me.  He just sends me a teleport.  And at first I 
used to always go, because I was nervous in Second Life, I was like, “oh, what if I make the king 
angry [if I don’t accept the teleport]?”  I wasn’t sure how much was real people [being rude and 
inconsiderate] and how much was role-play.   
The cuts the participants made between actual and virtual reality were associated with what information 
they considered versus ignored.  Maureen, for instance, would invoke RL details to make SL events less 
real and to reduce the power that role-play accorded certain individuals:  
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[The king of the clan has] even made comments, he’s very judgmental and said, “oh, you’re very 
rash and immature or whatever with your writing.”  “Well, who are you in real life?”  I mean, 
really?  “Are you on the Newbury committee, that you know about young adult writing?  What do 
you know?  You’re a computer programmer [in RL]!”  
Invoking the logic of correspondence between the actual and the virtual world, Maureen described SL as a 
“lying” environment: 
We’re just a bunch of adults lying to each other. … We're all lying!  I mean, I don't look like Yazhi.  
I don't look anything like her.   
Sara also described many of her interactions with her SL partner in terms of lies, but she also recognized 
the performative role such utterances played in terms of maintaining a co-constructed fantasy:    
So in some ways, we tell each other sweet little lies.  And it’s just very easy, because it’s just part of 
the fantasy.  I don’t really consider it a lie.  It’s more just trying to give the other person back what 
they give to you.   
Sara had experienced considerable difficulties with the distinction between actual and virtual reality.  
When she first joined SL, she got involved in a romantic relationship.  Married for 20 years and with no 
intention of leaving her spouse, her emotional attachment to her SL partner surprised her. She found 
herself unable to distinguish between what was going for Mantis and herself. However, what surprised her 
even more, was her reaction after the SL relationship ended.  Not only did it affect her physically (she was 
crying for weeks and struggled with sleeplessness and elevated blood pressure), but she also felt so hurt 
and rejected by the break-up that she started “picking up guys [in SL] and tossing them aside” just to 
make herself feel better. Because she was “not proud” of her “predatory” and “destructive” behavior, she 
even sought SL counseling to understand “why am I doing this?”  
Over time, she developed ways of establishing a clearer distinction between a “long-distance relationship” 
and a “Second Life thing.” She resolved that her current relationship in SL did not constitute an emotional 
affair, because she was not in love with the person behind her SL partner’s avatar. Rather she argued that 
she and her SL partner were in love with “the fantasy the other represents; we love the IDEA of each 
other's affection, and we love how the fantasy unfolds each night in SL.” As the following entry from one 
of her photo-diaries indicates, Sara regarded her SL relationship as “harmless” and while she noted the 
benefits of her SL liaison, she felt “safe” from any negative consequences: 
“In SL the greatest joy is the uncomplicated escape that a relationship provides. I feel it makes me 
overall quite a bit happier in my RL, and to me it is a harmless outlet for wandering thoughts and 
daring fantasies. I must admit, the ability to capture the attention of the opposite sex in any world 
is flattering. This harmless contact via the anonymity of a different name and a completely 
different look in SL feels much safer than a RL flirtation with RL consequences.”  
In order to help them make these agential cuts consistently on a daily basis, Sara and her SL partner 
relied on a number of discursive and material practices. They limited the amount of time they spent 
talking about RL things. Even though they caught each other up on their respective workdays, they kept 
these discussions on a superficial level as Sara felt that information about the messiness of real life ruined 
the perfection of the SL fantasy. They also actively sought out SL activities to serve as an escape or a daily 
“mini-vacation.” For this, they relied on the different material environments that SL offered. They 
explored new sims and went shopping and bargain hunting. This fed fed into their continuous 
experimentation with their avatars’ embodiments as they tried out new skins, shapes and clothes. By 
means of these material practices, the differences between actual and virtual reality were highlighted, thus 
reminding them that their virtual lives fell squarely in the realm of fantasy.  
One material-discursive practice Mantis relied on to maintain the separation between “real-life and 
fantasy” was using only text-based communication (rather than voice and/or video). This ensured that 
conversations were mediated by her avatar and in 3rd person speech.  For instance, when she wrote emote 
statements, they would show up on screen as “Mantis Avalon looks deeply into your eyes.” To Sara, this 
created a text that resembled a romance novel, which further underscored the fictional nature of these 
exchanges.  
Human-Computer Interaction 
14 Thirty Second International Conference on Information Systems, Shanghai 2011  
Furthermore, she relied also on the physical materiality of her actual environment to make cuts between 
the virtual and the “real.”  Specifically, she started using a desktop computer located in the family den 
rather than her laptop that she could carry to private spaces. In this way, she had a legitimate reason to 
limit her communication to online chat. Furthermore, being in the same room as her TV-watching RL 
husband while she was in SL protected her from getting too deeply immersed and emotionally involved in 
her SL relationship.   
Another discursive practice Sara used was to rely on words like SLove, SLex and SLives to describe her 
activities and emotions related to her SL partner as a “Second Life thing,” rather than a “real” long 
distance relationship.  She thus concluded: 
So I think I have a great deal of affection for [my SL partner], and I tell him that I love him in 
Second Life, because, you know, as Mantis, … I really feel like we do have a love for each other.  
But it is very fantasy, you know, I mean, there’s no actual real basis. … I don’t know what kind of 
chemistry there would actually really be in real life.  I’ve thought about it, but it’s just not 
something I really wish to explore….So the fantasy to me, even though it’s a very complex 
fantasy,… at times it seems very real and I do invest a lot of my emotion in it, I really do feel firmly 
that it is a fantasy. 
 
It is interesting to note that the material practices apparent in these examples, involve both digital and 
physical material.  In other words, different boundaries between the virtual and the “real” world are 
enacted when people use voice vs. text-only, what their physical surrounding is like when they engage in 
the virtual world, and what actions the virtual world affords with respect to interactions with geographies, 
objects and people. Not only is the assemblage that is the avatar shaped by these agential cuts, but so is 
what people perceive as virtual and “real.”    
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Virtual worlds are utterly contrived and artificial simulacra of the actual world. As such, they offer exciting 
new opportunities to question taken-for-granted, supposedly naturally-occurring binaries such as 
subject/objects, human/non-human, and reality/fantasy and to explore computer-mediated work and 
play in ways that do not rely on a priori boundaries between people and technology, online and off-line 
identities, and actual and virtual reality. Given the inherently performative nature of virtual worlds 
(Schultze and Orlikowski 2010), this research has applied a performative ontology to answer the research 
question how virtual worlds users construct identity, agency and worlds within their in-world experience. 
The empirical data highlights that the users of virtual worlds indeed experience their avatars as 
entanglements whose constitutive elements are difficult to discern.  With regard to identity, for instance, 
it was unclear to them, whether their real selves or their avatars had primacy. They talked about becoming 
their avatar and their avatar becoming them. Furthermore, at different points in time, their avatar 
represented who they had been, who they were and who they wanted to be. Relying on discursive 
practices, such as referring to the avatar in third person, the users separated themselves from their avatar. 
Additionally, they relied on the material practice of adopting different virtual embodiments, i.e., alts, to 
draw identity boundaries.    
With regard to agency, the users relied on both discursive and material practices to make agential cuts 
that separated human from technological agency. For instance, numerous users relied on the 
technological features of virtual worlds including the avatar’s looping animations to fake their own 
presence and attention in-world. In other words, what appeared to be human agency directing the avatar 
was actually technological agency. However, the user him or herself was also witness to this technological 
agency because they also saw their avatar performing certain automated facial expressions and body 
language.  This reflexive performativity (Powers 2003) also contributed to their view of the avatar as 
having cognition, emotions and intentionality independent of them.  Additionally, by talking about the 
avatar as an autonomous agent, they discursively strengthened this separation. Also, if users viewed their 
avatar as interfacing with the technological features (e.g., menus, in-world chat), they were likely to 
attribute to them tremendous power and control over the virtual world.  
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With regard to the world dimension, it is interesting to note that users relied not only on discursive and 
digitally-material practices to make agential cuts that helped them deal with the ambiguous distinctions 
between reality and fantasy, but also on physically-material practices.  This suggests that this boundary 
the most challenging for users to manage. For this reason, they developed numerous practices to help 
them draw the boundaries between the actual and virtual reality in a consistent manner on an ongoing 
basis.  
In the spirit of sociomateriality, this paper highlights the role that material plays in the constitution of 
phenomena. In particular, it identifies practices that rely on both digital and physical material to enact 
agential cut in the assemblage that is the avatar.  By so doing, this research acknowledge not only that 
social/discursive practices constitute technology, but that technology/materiality also constitutes the 
user. Thus, the ability to embody different versions of oneself into different avatars, makes people see 
themselves as being multi-faceted. Furthermore, being able to embody an idealized image of oneself and 
to enact a “perfect” relationship using digital material, constitutes an actual world that is deficient and 
characterized by constraints rather then possibilities.  Thus, where, how and why users enact identity, 
agency and world cuts has implications for how users constitute both their actual and virtual lives. 
Sociomaterial theorizing also highlights that agency does not reside in any one actor, e.g., human or 
technological. Instead, it is the result of the sociomaterial entanglement.  This has consequences for moral 
agency, which is typically seen as human in nature.  Can we really say that in virtual worlds, the user is 
ultimately responsible for avatar-based actions? To what extent is the avatar’s material agency equally 
responsible for actions taken in-world?    
The boundary drawing practices, and particularly the logic underlying them, have implications not just for 
virtual worlds, but also for contemporary organizational settings that are marked by globalization and 
virtual work. Here, individuals are increasingly experiencing their lives in a hybrid space that combines 
cyberspace and geographical space, as well as virtual and actual reality (Madge and O'Connor 2005).   
More and more, they engage in both spaces concurrently and recognize them as inextricably intertwined 
and mutually constitutive. It is in this liminal space where distinctions between the on- and the off-line 
identities, human and technological agency, and between “real” and virtual worlds are blurred, that 
organizational participants increasingly have to construct and manage their identities.    
One need only look at how people’s identities are increasingly constructed on Facebook to see how 
important socially agreed-upon boundary-drawing practices are becoming. For instance, which parts of 
Facebook are deemed to be separate from the user’s “real” identity: wall-posts by friends or friends of 
friends?  How will people use cuts between technical and human agency to reduce their responsibility for 
posts that are harmful to themselves and others?    
This paper’s key contribution is demonstrating such sociomaterial concepts as assemblage and agential 
cuts empirically. There has been considerable conceptual and theoretical research on sociomateriality 
(e.g., Leonardi and Barley 2008; Orlikowski 2007; Orlikowski and Scott 2008), however, with the 
exception of a few papers (e.g., Introna and Hayes 2011; Leonardi 2011) there have been few empirical 
applications of these concepts. Furthermore, demonstrating these concepts in the context of virtual world 
technologies is compelling, because on the one hand there such powerful parallels between bodies, objects 
and geographies in the real and virtual worlds, but on the other there is a clear recognition that virtual 
worlds are completely digital and designed, implying that it does not exist until it is rendered on a user’s 
browser.  As such, a priori boundaries between the social and the material are misplaced. In the virtual 
world, the user does not exist without the avatar and vice versa.   
Because virtual worlds are inherently performative, it is easier to see the value of the performative lens in 
this context than it is in more traditional contexts such as email or ERP system use. Nevertheless, the 
peformative lens is equally valuable in those research contexts; it is just harder to discern because of the 
taken-for-granted cuts that both the research and user community has enacted in these settings over the 
years.  Thus, this research might provide insight for how to theorize performative identity, agency and 
world-making relationships in more traditional information systems.   
It is important to note, that the analytical cuts that were made in this paper to distinguish among the 
three dimensions of the avatar assemblage are problematic.  Ultimately, these dimensions do not exist in 
practice. Indeed, the overlapping nature of the three categories was apparent throughout the theoretical 
and empirical discussion.  Nevertheless, with the understanding that has been gained by distinguishing 
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along these three analytical dimensions, future research might explore what dimensions are created in 
practice.   
While this research has focused only on how boundaries related to the avatar are drawn, future research 
might explore questions of when and why certain agential cuts are made and what patterns emerges by 
comparing these practices across the different domains of use. Furthermore, by comparing the boundary 
drawing practices across different virtual worlds, the material conditions of these practices should become 
clearer.   
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